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Abstract
Objective: Doping in sports now seems to be more widespread despite testing. The objective is to assess the 
effectiveness and cost effectiveness of the current anti-doping system.
Methods: A probability and cost analysis was performed. Using calculations based on official world-level data of 
positive doping test results, sensitivity and frequency of testing in 93 categories of sport, and estimates of numerical 
characteristics (frequency, window of detectability, test predictability)
Results: A low probability of doping detection was demonstrated; 0.029 for doping once a week by a single random 
test with average sensitivity (40%) and window of detectability of 48 hours. With 12 tests a year probability of detection of 
continuous doping is ~33%. To detect 100% of doping in one year 16-50 tests per athlete must be done costing ~$25,000.
Conclusion: Testing is not economically viable for effective detection. Changes are thus required to the current 
system to combat sophisticated doping techniques.
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Introduction
The year 1968 saw the International Olympic Committee’s 
(IOC) first true attempt to combat doping in sport [1]. A number of 
international sporting organisations had attempted to address the issue 
of doping in sports before this point, one notable example being the 
International Association of Athletic Federations (IAAF). These early 
attempts however proved to be little more than hopeful, as they lacked 
a key component necessary for such anti-doping systems; anti-doping 
testing. Similarly, even the IOC’s early attempts were, it can be argued, 
ambitious but ultimately lacked substance. It is well known that early 
anti-doping testing was, at best, rudimentary and, perhaps, did little 
more than keep up the appearance of combatting the issue of doping. 
The IOC’s decision to finally introduce measures to curb doping, was in 
response to numerous doping related deaths and controversies. Whilst, 
these attempts were ambitious, in many ways they simply have not lived 
up to the promise they once had. Numerous high profile scandals, such 
as East Germany [2], China [3], and more recently Lance Armstrong 
and US Postal [4] only revealed years after the fact, have shown the 
fragility of the anti-doping system both past and present. 
It has been suggested by a number of different peoples in the sporting 
arena, including officials, athletes, and scientists, that the current 
(and past) anti-doping systems are both ineffective and inefficient. 
Furthermore, current doping detection statistics, in some sports, under 
represent the true extent of doping in sports [5]. This demonstrates 
that there is a need for an assessment of various factors influencing 
the success of anti-doping systems. There has been considerable work 
produced on the factors influencing an athlete’s decision to dope [6,7], 
the reasons behind doping [8,9], and consequences of doping [8,10]. 
However, little work has been produced to actually assess the factors 
within the sporting and anti-doping system which may influence the 
effectiveness and efficiency of anti-doping testing. It is true that the 
anti-doping system as a whole can be argued as to also include the 
education of anti-doping, the programs in place to attempt to deter 
doping etc. However, it should be pointed out that it can also be argued 
that testing and the science behind the testing leading to detection or 
not, is the primary tool in anti-doping. Education is definitely of help, 
but without a means to find any wrong doing education alone would 
not prevent doping. As such this paper primarily focuses on testing as 
the pivotal element of the anti-doping system. Therefore, one must ask 
the question, despite the apparent efforts of sporting bodies for almost 
a century, why does doping continue to be a problem? Why is it that 
even today when testing is widespread, random out-of-competition 
testing is performed, prohibited lists are updated regularly and experts 
are consulted on the systems to be used, why do these problems persist? 
Perhaps this is simply because irrespective of the system in place some 
people will always want to cheat. Or perhaps the problems lie within the 
anti-doping system itself, an inherent flaw within this paper sets out to 
investigate this question, to assess the current anti-doping system and 
to determine if there are indeed issues with its very structure, or rather 
if factors of the real world impact its efficiency and effectiveness. 
To elaborate, one key component of the current anti-doping 
system is test sensitivity. There seems to be some debate on this area 
and it tends to be a somewhat contentious issue amongst scientists. 
The success rate of anti-doping testing has been reported in some cases 
to be less than 10%, and on average less than 50% [11,12]. Whilst this 
figure is not definitive on the balance of probabilities, based on the 
available information, this seems to be a reasonable estimate. This is 
but one example of the issues in anti-doping systems, upon further 
investigation the issues appear to expand exponentially. Current testing 
systems are influenced by numerous factors of the sporting world that 
simply cannot be restrained by theoretical frameworks and the best 
hopes of policy formers. Test success rates, doping techniques aimed 
at deliberate circumventing of testing (e.g. micro-dosing), and in some 
cases minimalistic sample collection due to economic restraints are all 
examples of the real world (and evolving nature) of sports and doping, 
that makes inflexible rules on paper fail in everyday life. Consequently 
anti-doping practices are less effective in their mission than one 
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would hope; the simple reality of it is that not all dopers are caught; 
the issues with US Postal are testament to this fact. If one then adds 
to these factors the additional evolving factors of the sporting world, 
window of detection and randomization of selection for testing, one 
begins to get the picture as to the current state of doping detection; 
a less than optimal system. The aim of this research is, therefore, to 
assess the extent to which the current anti-doping systems are effective 
and efficient in their task of deterring, preventing and detecting anti-
doping infringements. Unlike other papers, this research does not focus 
solely on the psychology of the athlete, the fear or threat factor, or even 
a discussion of issues with punishment as a means of deterrent. Rather 
this paper analyses the effectiveness and efficiency of anti-doping 
systems with the assistance of statistics and realities of human biology. 
Moreover, this paper seeks to assess whether the realities of the sporting 
world and athletes action manage to invalidate the anti-doping practices 
or demonstrate inherent flaws in the system. The reasons being, that if 
such issues do exist in the current system and these issues are able to 
be demonstrated, perhaps this will aid policy makers and organizations 
to amend the legislation. The eventual end result of this research is 
hopefully to ensure a fairer sporting environment for all participants, 
through the creating of policies that are both more efficient and effective 
in detection and prevention.
Anti-doping policies and realities
It is prudent to begin with an outline of some of the key arguments 
as to the existence of anti-doping systems and furthermore, the opinions 
of the current level of success and issue of these policies as far as they 
exist.
Of the assortment of factors argued as being the reasons behind 
the creation and existence of anti-doping, the three most commonly 
included reasons are, 1) athlete’s health, 2) fairness and equality, and 3) 
sports should be a representation of a person’s natural abilities. Many of 
the international policies in sports contain some or all of these points 
as justification of their existence, the WADA Code [13] and UNESCO 
International Convention against Doping in Sport [14] are two such 
examples. What is more, there is also the inclusion of such terms as 
‘with the potential to’ enhance etc. “potential” is such an ambiguous 
term it is no doubt that there is much debate on the issue.
Human health: To begin with the health argument, the WADA 
code [13] lists health as (one of) the ‘fundamental rationale’s for the 
world anti-doping code’. The UNESCO International Convention 
against Doping in Sport [14], states it is “Concerned by the use of 
doping by athletes in sport and the consequences thereof for their 
health’ in its preamble. It is well reported that some doping agents 
do indeed have harmful effects, if not though their use then through 
their abuse [10,15]. Beastall et al. demonstrated the deadly outcome 
of injection of insulin in a healthy adult. Despite this, however, there 
is ample evidence that suggests that a number of substances listed on 
the WADA prohibited list have little to no evidence that they can cause 
harm. One such example can be seen in the recently banned Xenon gas. 
Some research [16] claims that it is in fact beneficial to human health 
and may provide ‘long term benefit’ with regard to strokes. In fact, 
many of the substances which are now abused as doping agents began 
their life as medicaments. Similarly, vitamins in sports are not banned 
substances. It is often argued that vitamins are necessary in order for 
athletes to be able to compete at the highest level, implying that without 
them athletes would not be able to recover as quick or perform as 
well (does this not sound like performance enhancing?). Vitamins are 
deemed safe, yet abuse of vitamins can be as harmful as the abuse of 
banned doping substance. There is ample evidence to support the idea 
that high doses of some vitamins can indeed result in negative health 
effects [17-19].
Fairness and equality: Similar arguments can be found with 
fairness and equality. These two concepts are often argued as being the 
backbone of anti-doping policy, the reason for its existence and the 
primary mission of the policies. It is often difficult to define exactly what 
the meanings of these terms are. They differ from person to person, 
depending on their own sets of values and morals. Furthermore, they 
are in effect intangibles; they have no physical substance and are often 
fluid in nature. Perhaps, however, one of the most useful definitions of 
what fairness and equality is and to a larger extent morality in sport 
can be found in the works of Kuchler, who defines it as accepting the 
‘opponent as a partner’, ‘keeping in the rules’, values victory no higher 
than their attitudes to opponents, refuses dishonour and inequality, and 
goes about it all good-heartedly [20].
Yet it can be said that sports, by its very nature, are not fair or equal. 
Athletes are never provided with the same opportunities to advance 
and compete. Athletes from third world nations or developing nations 
are automatically at a disadvantage be it because of dietary reasons, 
economic, or even access to training and opportunities to perform. 
Similarly, there is segregation between genders/sex and age. One could 
ask, if an athlete wants to compete with others of any background, sex 
or age and meet the performance requirements should they not be able 
to, without first gaining permission, and hoping permission will be 
granted. It is as if the very structure of sports promotes the idea that it 
is not a right but rather a privilege that one must earn and fight for. If 
this is the case, then it goes against everything claimed, not only by anti-
doping policies but, also against the very spirit of sports.
Natural abilities: Finally, the notion that sports should be a 
representation of a person’s natural abilities. This concept is self-
explanatory. However, like the previous two concepts there is much 
debate about it being touted as one of the primary reasons for anti-doping 
policy. To begin with, there is a question of what exactly constitutes 
natural abilities. Moreover, there is the debate about what constitutes 
an alteration of a person’s natural abilities. Much like the arguments 
outlined previously with regard to vitamins and doping practices, one 
must assess what constitutes enhancement and an alteration. Take 
vitamins again as an example. There would be those that consider 
the benefits that vitamins bestow upon an athlete (recovery, dietary 
supplementation etc.) as an indication that their performance is no 
longer natural. This is because, without these supplements, the athletes 
would not be able to perform at the high level, or at least not as long as 
they do and it would take longer to regain the chance of performing at 
this level again. Similarly as an example, there is the before mentioned 
argument of Xenon. One of the reasons this practice is banned is 
because it can be used as a form of performance enhancement. Yet it 
should be pointed out that Xenon is argued as performance enhancing; 
it simulates the effects of EPO doping. Its use is argued to stimulate 
Hypoxia Inducible Factors (HIF) particularly HFI-1α and as such it 
benefits the athlete in the same way as EPO doping. Yet it should be said 
that similar gains can be achieved through altitude training. Altitude 
training is, however, not a banned practice. If the aim of anti-doping 
is to preserve the fairness and natural abilities of an athlete, should not 
this form of training also be deemed to be altering the performance of 
the athlete and as such be banned? Similar arguments can be made for 
the use of caffeine, headache tablets, sleeping tablets and any assortment 
of proteins or other similar dietary supplements. These items are not 
banned, and are commonly used by athlete to help recover, sleep, block 
pain etc. all of which they would not ‘naturally’ be able to do without 
the use of the pharmaceutical or supplementary items. 
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Effectiveness according to some experts
There has also been some recent argument by some high level 
athletes that, despite the current anti-doping systems, even if they are 
effective, testing is at best rare. To elaborate, Chris Froome criticised the 
lack of anti-doping testing over a two week period during a key training 
camp for himself and two other high level cycling athletes [21,22]. 
Similarly in 2011 it was reported by Gerard Vroomen (2009-2010 head 
of Cervelo Test Team cycling), that ‘I have not heard of a rider being 
tested for the biological passport between the end of the 2010 Tour 
and April 2011’ [23]. This was later supported by Michael Ashenden 
a member of the UCI passport panel that stated ‘It’s correct that the 
observation made by Gerard Vroomen matches with my experience. 
I have noticed a significant gap between tests in some of the profiles 
I have reviewed’ [24]. This would therefore indicate that despite the 
justification behind anti-doping policies, their goals are less likely to be 
achieved if they are not even being performed, irrespective of the issues 
surrounding the system. 
This seems to indicate that there is much controversy as to the 
justification of anti-doping policies. This is especially true given the 
fact that the systems, as they currently operate, place a large number of 
restrictions on the personal liberties and privacy of athletes. Examples 
of which can be seen with the whereabouts requirement [25] (14.V.18), 
biological passport [26] (14.VI.120) and the rules governing urine 
collection [27] (7.2.4.). In fact Kayser, Mauron and Miah [28] suggested 
that ‘current anti-doping measures potentially introduce problems of 
greater impact than are solved’. Their paper critically assesses current 
anti-doping policies and concludes that they are in many ways based 
on a weak foundation. Naturally one would expect by this point in the 
development of anti-doping systems, the systems (as they currently 
are) would be finely tuned to ensure that they are effective and efficient 
in their goals. Furthermore, that they are successful in deterring 
doping and detecting it when it does occur. The realities are however, 
unfortunately quite different. There are factors inherent in the sporting 
systems and the testing practices as they exist that impact the success 
of anti-doping.
Window of detection
Window of Detection is in reference to the time frame in which a 
substance remains detectable in a human body before it is broken down/
absorbed and it is no longer possible to detect if an illegal substance has 
been used. Extant literature would seem to indicate that this figure, using 
the current testing at the disposal of WADA and anti-doping agencies 
worldwide, would range from as little as 12 hours to a maximum of 120 
hours. On the lower end of this scale 12-24 hours. Research conducted by 
Bidlingmaier, Wu, & Strasburger [29] showed that more contemporary 
forms of hGH, when administered by subcutaneous methods, return 
to baseline within 20 hours maximum following administration. They 
further outline that in some cases the window of these agents, when 
administered intramuscularly may even be as low as 8 hours. This has 
serious consequences for detection, particularly when coupled with the 
apparently increasing method of micro doping. Moreover, micro doping 
especially with recombinant human erythropoietin (rHuEPO) have 
been shown to fall into this low window of detectability also [30,31]. 
It was reported by Asheden et al. [30] that micro dosing reduced the 
window of detection of rHuEPO to as little as 12 hours. What this means 
is that should an athlete decide to dope immediately before long distance 
endurance event, such as the Le Mans 24 hour race, then by the time 
they are finished any trace of the substance would be removed. More 
concerning is the combination of these two pieces of research, micro 
doping with hGH. If intramuscular administration of hGH already has 
a window of 8 hours micro doping will reduce this further. This means 
that doping immediately before a race; particularly an endurance event, 
such as a cycling stage, would mean that the agent would be undetectable 
well before the end of the event. 
It has been found that for the more commonly found doping agents 
such as steroids and regular doses of rHuEPO that a greater window 
of detection is obtained, 48-72 hours [31-33]. The plasticizer di-(2-
ethylhexyl) phthalate (DEHP) (not a doping agent but argued as being 
evidence of blood doping) can also be grouped into this category. 
Research by Monfort, et al. [34] demonstrated that these metabolites 
remain in the system only up to 48 hours after infusion. 
Finally, even some of the more ‘traditional’ substances of doping 
such as hGH when applying contemporary techniques of detection still 
have a somewhat limited window. It has been reported by Erotokritou-
Mulligan, et al., [11] that the use of markers such as type 3 pro-collagen 
(P-III-P) for the detection of hGH may increase the window of detection 
to around 120 hours.
It should be pointed out that there is some research which 
demonstrates a longer window of detection of around 18-20 days. This 
research relates to some forms of methyltestosterone metabolite M2 
[35] and oxandrolone metabolite 17β-hydroxymethyl-17α-methyl-
18-nor-2-oxa-5α-androsta-13-en-3-on (OX M1) [36]. Yet it should 
be pointed out that other metabolites of methyltestosterone [35] and 
the ‘parent drug oxandrolone and its isomer epioxandrolone’ were 
only detectable for about 3days, which supports the findings of other 
research and justifies the use of the estimated figures in this research. 
However, in order to provide a more comprehensive view of the 
situation, calculations for these figures can be found in the proceeding 
sections.
Test sensitivity
Test sensitivity refers to the accuracy of testing. That is to say, if for 
example 100 tests were performed on samples with doping agents in 
them what percentage of them are likely to be classified as containing 
doping agents. It is next to impossible to have any technique that is 
100% accurate, in any and all cases of chemical testing there is some 
margin for error; false positives are an example of common errors that 
are known to occur. Upon closer inspection of the literature, which is 
at times apprehensive to outline the exact percentages of accuracy, one 
begins to obtain a clearer image of the current situation. 
The highest rates of success of doping detection have been reported 
as being between 60% and 80% success rate. It has been reported by 
Powrie et al., [37] that these levels could be obtained with cases of 
the more classical doping substance of hGH, when using N-terminal 
extension peptide of procollagen type III markers for detection, so 
contemporary techniques for classical problems. Yet other papers have 
reported far less encouraging results. Erotokritou-Mulligan et al., [11] 
reported that other forms of growth hormones such as hGH even when 
combined with the use of Insulin Growth Factor-1 (IGF-I) and P-III- P 
only resulted in a success rate of 40%. Worse still (and perhaps a worst 
case scenario) were the findings by Graham et al., [12], who reported 
that tests, conducted on both non-steroidal hormones and hGH, in 
some cases resulted in a successful detection rate of only 10%. This is 
extremely concerning for those in the fight against doping. These figures 
would seem to indicate that a majority of testing is at best hit or miss. 
Thus perhaps many doped athletes are slipping through the cracks.
Doping regime
Doping regime is in reference to the actual frequency of doping 
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as performed by athletes deciding to partake in the practice. Given 
the illegality of doping, and the potential for criminal prosecution in 
some counties including Austria (Gesamte Rechtsvorschrift für Anti-
Doping-Bundesgesetz, 2007) [38], France (Code du sport, 2012) [39] 
and Italy (Disciplina della tutela sanitaria delle attività sportive e della 
lotta contro il doping, 2000) [40], there is considerable apprehension 
by some athletes to reveal exactly the doping methods and frequencies 
used. Given this, information is limited, but some evidence does still exit. 
Graham et al. [12] reported that the doping regime of an anonymous 
UK champion was continuous, multiple times per week, that is to say 
regular doses when ‘required’ to ensure maximal performance. Further 
information is either lacking or ambiguous, but it is safe to say that given 
the intellect of athletes, some will be using doping agent intermittently 
so to attempt to ensure evasion of detection.
Predictability of testing
Test predictability is the likelihood that an athlete choosing to 
partake in doping is able to predict when the anti-doping sample will 
be required. To elaborate, if an athlete chooses to dope, it is highly 
unlikely they will do so without some level of thought going into both 
the decision to dope and the decision as to when to use the banned 
substances. In the case of the latter, the decision as to when to use, will be 
based in part on the likelihood that they will be tested or not within the 
window of detectability period. This likelihood can be argued as being 
primarily based on the past rates of anti-doping sample collection. That 
is to say how frequently they and other athletes around them have been 
selected for sample collection. The literature does not and more than 
likely is not able to list the figures for an athlete’s belief of when they 
will be tested and so alternative source data must be used to make this 
determination. As such reference to the statistics available from various 
nation anti-doping agencies (NADA) and the world anti-doping agency 
is needed to make this determination. These sources demonstrate vastly 
differing numbers relating the amounts of testing performed on various 
athletes in their care. It has been reported that these figures range from 
2 through to 24 tests a year [39-44]. These figures are dependent on 
a number of factors. These include the athlete in question, their rates 
of success in the events they compete, policies of the NADA, and 
more than likely the economic realities and resources available to the 
NADA. What this indicates is that the athlete in question is able to 
make approximate estimates on when they are likely to be tested, for 
example during a major competition, or before, or more generally when 
in a month they are likely to receive an out-of-competition test. All of 
which contributes to their decision making process and as such the 
predictability of testing.
Method
This research contains two different approaches to assessing the 
current effectiveness of the anti-doping system; these being a probability 
and a cost analysis of the current system of testing. 
Probability analyses are a useful tool to attempt to gain a better view 
of probable outcomes based on a set of uncertainties. They are often used, 
along with costs analyses, as a useful tool for assessment of effectiveness 
in health system research [43-47]. The initial step required was to conduct 
research into the factors influencing the successfulness of anti-doping 
testing using the current system. This was performed by examining 
extant literature on the topic. Information pertaining to factors involved 
in anti-doping testing and doping practices used by athletes was collected 
from official documents by anti-doping agencies, academic papers, 
media releases etc. Sources are quoted in the information that follows. It 
was found that an assortment of factors influence the probability doping 
will be detected, and as such it was necessary to attempt to quantify these 
factors. Anti-doping testing does not always result in a positive detection 
even if and athlete may be engaging in doping. The factors relate to the 
sporting world impact the actual real life test success. These factors were 
determined to be as follows based on the literature as outlined previously; 
a) window of detection, b) test sensitivity, c) doping regime, and d) 
predictability of testing. 
Given the realities, certain conclusions can be made as the necessary 
parameters to make up the formula to asses probability of success of 
the anti-doping system. Each of these influences can be considered a 
variable contributing to the probability of doping detection in a single 
test. The realities are, a) the window of detection is limited, b) sensitivity 
of tests is mostly low, c) doping substances may be used intermittently 
by athletes to help avoid detection, and also d) athletes may guess when 
a test will occur. The total probability of detection will be a product 
of probabilities of the four contributing variables, window of detection 
(W), test sensitivity (S), doping regime (D), and predictability of 
testing (T). Given this, the second step was to construct a formula 
demonstrating the likelihood of detection of doping, based on these 
factors. This formula is as follows: 
P= W×S×D×T
Where:
W= window of detection in hours expressed as a fraction of a week 
assuming week or 168 hours = 1
S= test sensitivity
D= how often doping occurs, 1.0 being continuous use and fractions 
indicating intermittent use
T= test predictability per person per week, expressed as the number 
of tests that could be expected per year divided by the number of weeks 
in the year (52). 
For example a test with a window of detection of 24 hours i.e. 0.14 
in a week, with 40% test sensitivity with a person continuously doping 
i.e. 1.0 in each week, and predictability of 0.25 because random tests 
occur on average once a month will produce an overall probability of 
0.014 of a random test to be successful. This means that the probability 
of a random test to be unsuccessful is 0.986, close enough to certainty 
in most situations. 
This concept is depicted graphically in Figure 1 and demonstrates 
Figure 1: Graphic representation of the factors influencing the probability of 
detection and their relationship to one another.
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the relationship between the four elements and their influence on the 
probability of doping detection. It shows that each element affecting 
the probability of doping detection also has an impact on each other 
element. For example, the window of detectability impacts an athlete’s 
doping regime and test predictability. As too does test sensitivity. An 
athlete’s doping regime is also impacted by the test predictability, and 
so on (Figure 1).
There are a number of reasons why the literature is apprehensive 
to reveal definitive numbers pertaining to some of these variables. 
These reasons include, but are not limited to, the clandestine nature of 
doping, the lack of dedicated research into each of these components, 
and apprehension of publication of controversial findings with regard 
to doping, to name but a few. Thus a range of estimates was used. The 
estimates used for this research are found in table 1, and are based on 
the findings in the literature as outlined previously (Table 1).
Similarly, a majority of the substances relate to Androgenic Anabolic 
Steroid (AAS) and Growth Hormone (GH). EPO, blood doping and 
stimulants are used and can all be very effective methods of doping. 
Unfortunately given the somewhat contemporary origins of some of 
these substances, the lack of funding for doping research in some cases 
and the general clandestine nature of doping, research in these area’s 
does not provide sufficient information to make a reliable assumption.
The odds of detection per year were calculated as the inverse of 
the probability of detection in a single test multiplied by the number 
of tests during a year. The odds of detection in the entire career were 
based on the assumption of a career of 15 year duration with the annual 
probabilities unchanging. Thus these odds were an inverse of 15 times 
the probability of detection per year times the number of tests per year.
The final step in this research was to conduct a cost analysis. This 
was done in order to attempt to ascertain the feasibilities of anti-doping 
testing given the realities of the sporting world. A cost analysis is a 
useful tool for this as it takes into consideration economic realities 
from numerous sources and can help paint a more complete and 
tangible picture of what really is happening in reference to real world 
economics. Cost (and economics) analyses of doping are useful tools 
when it comes to assessing sports related expenses, and have been used 
by a number of internationally renowned experts in sports as a tool for 
assessing efficiency [48-50].
The analysis for this research was a two-step process. Firstly it 
was necessary to determine the amount of testing needed to, in all 
probability, actually detect doping when it occurs. Following this 
these numbers were then assessed in light of the costs associated with 
standardized urine testing, with figures available from the Australian 
Sports Anti-Doping Authority. More details relating to these figures are 
outlined in the relevant sections following.
Results and Discussion
Odds of doping detection
A series of calculations have been performed using values as 
established from the literature as were outlined previously in the 
methods section, these calculations can be seen in Table 2. The column 
entitled Sport with detection rate matching odds, is an indication of 
Variable Estimated Values Drug Types
Window of detectability
12 – 24 hours 
48 – 72 hours 
120 hours
hGH, micro doping rHuEPO
common agents, rHuEPO, DEHP





non-steroidal hormones and hGH
hGH (with IGF-I, P-III-P)
 hGH (N-terminal extension 
peptide of procollagen type III)
Doping Regime 1.0 (continuous) 0.5 (intermittent)














per person per 
week
Probability of 
detection in a 
single test












12 0.4 1 0.25 0.0071 12 12:1 1:1
18 0.4 1 0.25 0.0107 12 8:1 1:1
48 0.4 1 0.25 0.0286 12 3:1 0:1
72 0.4 1 0.25 0.0429 12 2:1 0:1
120 0.4 1 0.25 0.0714 12 1:1 0:1
12 0.4 1 0.038 0.0011 2 461:1 31:1
18 0.4 1 0.038 0.0016 2 307:1 20:1
48 0.4 1 0.038 0.0043 2 115:1 8:1 Sailing, Athletics




120 0.4 1 0.038 0.0109 2 46:1 3:1
12 0.8 1 0.038 0.0022 2 230:1 15:1
18 0.8 1 0.038 0.0033 2 154:1 10:1 Aquatics, Sailing
48 0.8 1 0.038 0.0087 2 58:1 4:1 Basketball, Cycling
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72 0.8 1 0.038 0.0130 2 38:1 3:1
120 0.8 1 0.038 0.0217 2 23:1 2:1
12 0.1 1 0.038 0.0003 2 1842:1 123:1
18 0.1 1 0.038 0.0004 2 1228:1 82:1
48 0.1 1 0.038 0.0011 2 461:1 31:1
72 0.1 1 0.038 0.0016 2 307:1 20:1
120 0.1 1 0.038 0.0027 2 184:1 12:1 Shooting
12 0.1 0.5 0.038 0.0001 2 3684:1 246:1
18 0.1 0.5 0.038 0.0002 2 2456:1 164:1
48 0.1 0.5 0.038 0.0005 2 921:1 61:1
72 0.1 0.5 0.038 0.0008 2 614:1 41:1 Bobsleigh
120 0.1 0.5 0.038 0.0014 2 368:1 25:1
12 0.4 0.5 0.038 0.0005 2 921:1 61:1
18 0.4 0.5 0.038 0.0008 2 614:1 41:1 Bobsleigh
48 0.4 0.5 0.038 0.0022 2 230:1 15:1 Fencing
72 0.4 0.5 0.038 0.0033 2 154:1 10:1 Aquatics. Athletics
120 0.4 0.5 0.038 0.0054 2 92:1 6:1 Cycling, Rugby
12 0.4 0.5 0.25 0.0036 12 23:1 2:1
18 0.4 0.5 0.25 0.0054 12 16:1 1:1 Bridge
48 0.4 0.5 0.25 0.0143 12 6:1 0:1 Bodybuilding
72 0.4 0.5 0.25 0.0214 12 4:1 0:1
120 0.4 0.5 0.25 0.0357 12 2:1 0:1
12 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0089 24 5:1 0:1
18 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0134 24 3:1 0:1
48 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0357 24 1:1 0:1
72 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0536 24 1:1 0:1
120 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0893 24 0:1 0:1
12 0.4 0.5 0.125 0.0018 6 93:1 6:1 Triathalon
18 0.4 0.5 0.125 0.0027 6 62:1 4:1 Equestrian, Rugby





72 0.4 0.5 0.125 0.0107 6 16:1 1:1 Bridge, Sambo
120 0.4 0.5 0.125 0.0179 6 9:1 1:1
12 0.4 1 0.125 0.0036 6 47:1 3:1 Weightlifiting, Rollersport, Golf
18 0.4 1 0.125 0.0054 6 31:1 2:1 Airsports
48 0.4 1 0.125 0.0143 6 12:1 1:1 Muay Thai
72 0.4 1 0.125 0.0214 6 8:1 1:1
120 0.4 1 0.125 0.0357 6 5:1 0:1
12 0.4 0.5 0.188 0.0027 9 41:1 3:1 Weightlifiting
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those sports which have a detection rate which coincides to the figures 
provided by WADA and its adverse analytical findings (Table 3). It was 
decided to use the WADA adverse analytical finding (AAF) figures 
instead of Anti-Doping Rule Violation (ADRV) figures as this research 
relates to the detection of doping agents not justifications of how they 
entered the athletes’ system and thus subsequent legal and ethical 
considerations (Table 2).
If one were to therefore use a set of commonly encountered values 
(W= 48, S = 0.4, D=1 and T=0.25) to calculate a probability of doping 
detection in one random test, one gets p= 0.029; meaning that in a 
single test there is only approximately a 2.9% chance of doping being 
detected.
When this is then extrapolated to yearly detection, if one were to 
select 12 tests a year as an average, then this results in a detection rate 
of approximately 34% or an odds ratio of 3:1. This indicates that there is 
in fact a 66% chance of a doped athlete not being detected, quite good 
odds for someone willing to take a risk. This calculation is based on 
an assumption that tests are done completely randomly without prior 
warning and without predictability. Where an exact date of a test is 
predictable, the risk of detection would decline even further, even with 
12 tests per year. Similarly, if one incorporates the extended window of 
detection of 21 days, one obtains the following, 21 days x 0.4 sensitivity, 
intermittent doping of 0.5, and predictability of 0.125, resulting in 
an overall probability of 0.075 meaning that even in this case there is 
only a 7.5% chance of being detected in a single test or 92.5% chance 
of escaping detection. Assuming continuous doping this figure comes 
down to 85% that is still far away from 50/50 risk taking.
This makes the risk potentially psychologically acceptable to the 
“doper” [51]. To elaborate, it would seem less likely that an athlete who 
feels that they have a high probability of getting caught would partake 
in doping. On the other hand athletes who feel that there is a high 
probability they will escape detection would be more likely to engage 
in doping. This is because they may well feel that the result of doping 
would bring significant rewards without significant risk, the notion of 
a cost-risk ratio. It can be argued that despite the inherent flaws in the 
anti-doping systems, this is one feature that provides the most benefit, 
the impression that anti-doping is effective. Even if it is not, the sheer 
power of an athlete believing it is may in some cases deter them from 
engaging. This is the notion of cost-risk ratio, the idea that athletes weigh 
up the costs of the likelihood of getting caught and the consequence if 
they do vs. the benefits if they don’t. It would seem that as the current 
anti-doping systems are structured and the problems associated with 
detection, some athlete may see the benefits significantly outweighing 
the risks. 
However, similarly to this notion of fear and deterrence, there 
is another element of anti-doping testing which contributes to its 
effectiveness but is not directly related to success of detection. This 
concept relates back to Foucault’s Panopticon [52] and more recently 
the work by Haggerty and Ericson’s [53] on surveillant assemblage. 
This notion presents the idea that the panopticon (or other forms 
of surveillance) results in a decline of undesirable behaviours. One 
could say it is a form of negative reinforcement. This concept having 
its origins in a theoretical prison system, purports that an inmate 
watched or believing they are watched (even if they are not) are less 
18 0.4 0.5 0.188 0.0040 9 28:1 2:1 Morocycle racing
48 0.4 0.5 0.188 0.0107 9 10:1 1:1
72 0.4 0.5 0.188 0.0161 9 7:1 0:1
120 0.4 0.5 0.188 0.0269 9 4:1 0:1
12 0.4 1.0 0.188 0.0054 9 21:1 1:1 Kickboxing
18 0.4 1.0 0.188 0.0081 9 14:1 1:1 Muay Thai
48 0.4 1.0 0.188 0.0215 9 5:1 0:1 Bodybuilding
72 0.4 1.0 0.188 0.0322 9 3:1 0:1
120 0.4 1.0 0.188 0.0537 9 2:1 0:1
Table 2: Probabilities of doping detection.
Discipline Adverse Analytical Findings % Discipline Adverse Analytical Findings %
Aikido 0.00 Hockey 1.32
Air sports 3.09 Judo 1.13
Archery 1.47 Kendo 0.00
Athletics 0.78 Kickboxing 4.97
Baseball 1.99 Motorcycle racing 4.15
Basketball 1.45 Muay Thai 8.11
Biathlon 0.00 Netball 0.83
Billiards 4.24 Powerboating 0.00
Bobsleigh 0.16 Powerlifting 4.88
Bodybuilding and fitness 18.09 Rowing 0.23
Boxing 1.94 Rugby 1.39
Bridge 6.00 Skiing 0.71
Cycling 1.19 Sleddog 3.70
Darts 2.70 Weightlifting 2.42
Football 0.48 Wrestling 1.23
Golf 2.04 Wushu 1.68
Table 3: Adverse Analytical Findings % for an assortment of sports [41].
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likely to engage in negative behaviors. This, as it relates to sports, would 
seem to be reasonable, for even if anti-doping is not effective per se, 
perhaps the mere existence of testing may deter some athletes from 
doping for fear they might possibly be caught as they are always being 
watched. There are, however, two problems that exist here. Firstly, some 
people prefer the notion of being watched, the idea that it is more of 
a challenge to ‘beat the system’. Secondly, in some areas of the world, 
capital punishment still exists for certain crimes. Some states of the 
United States are one such example. Moreover, the United States, being 
one the world’s, most technologically advanced nations have ample 
systems of surveillance of its citizens in place, not only video but there 
are also numerous organizations which exist to this end. Despite this 
reality, crimes are still committed; murders are still committed, even 
with the death penalty in place and constant surveillance. The thought 
that simply watching someone will eliminate the darker sides of human 
nature is both unrealistic and delusional. It may, in some limited cases, 
work, but if someone is determined enough to cheat they will find a way 
despite all the surveillance and punishments possible. 
What the above results indicate is that by using current statistics it 
would seem that the likelihood of being caught doping is somewhere 
between 0.1 and 10% in a single test. To put this in perspective, the 
most complete and considered official current statistics pertaining to 
adverse analytical findings are provided by the World Anti-Doping 
Agency [54]. These findings, per sport, range anywhere from 0 to about 
18% [41]. This would seem to indicate that given the findings of this 
research, the extent to which doping occurs is very high. Theoretically, 
using these figures, if one were to assume that 100% of athletes dope, 
because of the limited window of detection, low test sensitivity and 
infrequent testing, it is likely to have result in 2.9% of adverse findings 
only. To elaborate, according to the calculations, if W= 0.29 (48hours), 
S = 0.4, D=1 and T=0.25, one obtains a 2.9% chance of doping detection 
in a single test. Therefore if one was to then again refer to the statistics 
available from WADA a sport with an adverse analytical finding of 2.9% 
(such as is closely the case with darts) would seem to indicate that given 
these conditions a vast majority of athletes in that sport were engaged 
in doping. Assuming tests were completely random and every athlete 
doped regularly, then the percentage of positive test findings (adverse 
analytical findings) would be low, roughly corresponding to actual data 
published by WADA.
This indicates two things. 1) That doping is far more widespread 
than official figures would lead one to believe and 2) That the current 
system of anti-doping testing is inadequate to eliminate doping. This 
supposition is supported by a number of officials [55] in the sporting 
arena, some athletes [56] and numerous others involved in sports 
including academics [28,57]. It should be noted that scientific literature 
does not always quote specific examples. For this reason they must 
be searched for in websites and popular literature. This is why such 
examples were used above. Illicit activities can hardly be researched 
systematically and this is why formal scientific literature does not 
provide relevant information. As outlined previously it can be said that 
it appears as though anti-doping policies are in place more for reasons 
of perceptions and deterrence through fear then for any effective and 
efficient scientific merit. This lends further support for the assertions 
by Hermann & Henneberg, [58] as to the relationship both perceptions 
and image has to modern sports, their participants and anti-doping.
Rates of doping
Table 3 demonstrates current WADA statistics relating to adverse 
analytical results.
Whilst it should be pointed out that, by WADA’s own admission, 
these data are not entirely complete; they do still provide a reasonable 
approximation of the extent of findings in each discipline. When the 
figures in Table 3 are compared to the calculations in Table 2, Table 4 
can be thus derived.
These comparisons demonstrate the assumptions under which 
the current doping rates would represent a mere portion of the actual 
doping rates. Continuous or intermittent in Table 4 are based on those 
in Table 2. Cycling can be used as one such example; WADA statistics 
indicate a 1. 19 % adverse analytical test result for the sport. If we then 
use the assumption that there is an 48 hour window of detection of 
the agents used, a 80% accuracy of testing, doping agents are used 
continuously and athletes can predict testing in a week knowing that 
they will be tested about 3 times a year, this allows the possibility to 
calculate that about 100% of cyclists would be participating in doping. 
This is done in the following manner, 48 hour window (48/168=0.286) 
× Sensitivity of 0.84× continuous regime (1.0) × test predictability 
0.0576 = 1.32%. If WADA statistics indicate that in cycling just over 
1.0% adverse analytical findings are made then this indicates that a 
significantly higher proportion of athletes in the sport are participating 
in doping and due to restrictions of the anti-doping system are simply 
not getting detected. Whilst it is unrealistic to suggest that all cyclists are 
using doping agents, the suggestion does remain that the figures do not 
truly represent actual rates of doping. Similar, are the results seen with 
baseball. Whilst it should be pointed out that this sport historically did 
not conform to the WADA guidelines for anti-doping testing they still 
performed some anti-doping tests, some of which are indeed used by 
other sports. The results are similar to that of cycling. These conclusions 
are supported by findings of the Mitchell Report which stated that 
‘the use of steroids in Major League Baseball was widespread’ [59]. 
Moreover, the same report acknowledged the fact that not all substances 
are detectable (in the case of the Mitchell Report the researchers were 
referring to hGH) [59]. It also concluded that ‘Baseball does not need 
and cannot afford to engage in a never-ending search for the name of 
every player who ever used performance enhancing substances’ [59]. 
This could be argued as indicating two things. Firstly, that doping 
use in Baseball was so widespread it would be next to impossible to 
make a complete list. Second, perhaps that given the nature of doping 
detection, clandestine nature of doping and the opposition faced by the 
researchers [59] such an investigation would be next to impossible.
Testing requirements
The fact that tests are not working well is illustrated by WADA’s 
recent decision to increase the length of doping bans from 2 to 4 years 
when the 2015 code comes into force in 2015 [60] with the aim of 
increasing the deterrent effect of the penalty. In law enforcement this 
practice it is usually performed when detection of a wrongdoing is 





Corresponding doping characteristics if all 
athletes dope
Window of 
Detection Test Accuracy Dosage
Air Sports 3.09 18 40% Continuous
Archery 1.47 48 40% Continuous
Baseball 1.99 48 40% Continuous
Bobsleigh 0.16 72 10% Interval
Cycling 1.19 48 80% Continuous
Football 0.48 48 40% Interval
Rowing 0.23 48 10% Continuous
Table 4: Actually reported adverse analytical findings and corresponding possible 
doping characteristics under assumption that all athletes in a given sport apply 
doping.
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penalty for a wrongdoing will have no impact on the criminal behavior 
[61,62]. On the other hand it could be argued that this increase was 
to attempt to combat the perceived unfairness of current bans, which 
could result in Olympic athletes not missing a single Olympics. This, 
however, would depend on when the ban was passed out. Furthermore, 
professional sports being what they are currently, it is unlikely that a 
top level professional athlete after missing 2 seasons would be at the 
same level of fitness as before, especially race fitness. As such a ban of 2 
years would still have an effect on their actual success rate. 4 years may 
amplify this effect, but one must be careful that if the athlete is to be 
given a second chance, the length of suspension is not too long. 
As such this research demonstrates that a new approach to anti-
doping policy is needed. Given the current realities of doping in 
professional sports, the question remains, what regime is required to 
begin to combat doping?
Table 5 depicts the number of tests needed per year to detect doping 
effectively. This was calculated using the figures and assumptions 
provided in Table 2. The number of tests needed was calculated as an 
inverse of T (predictability) required to achieve 100% detection with 
given windows of detection, continuity/intermittency of use and test 
reliabilities. The results of Table 5 indicate that the number of doping 
tests in many sports will need to be unrealistically increased in order to 
effectively combat doping. Indications are such that should anti-doping 
testing remain unchanged legislation would need to be modified to 
accommodate the realities of doping. One interesting point worth 
investigating in Table 5 is the number of yearly tests needed per athlete 
to detect doping (with relative effectiveness) in cycling. The theoretical 
figures would seem to indicate 16 tests per year would be sufficient to 
do so. Currently in cycling, either through the UCI, or the national 
anti-doping agencies, some athletes would no doubt already submit 
this many samples. One would normally expect that the most successful 
and high profile athletes would normally be the ones that would be 
subjected to such a large number of tests a year. This, however, may be 
questionable, given the statements outlined previously by Chris Froome 
and the lack of testing he and other top cyclists experienced. Even if this 
was an isolated case and testing over that small period was lacking, and 
throughout the rest of the year testing is extensive why then are many 
doping cases in cycling being revealed only through self-admission 
rather than positive tests? One possible argument can be seen with the 
revelations in the Lance Armstrong case there are a number of other 
factors which play a role in successful detection. These factors are 
such that they cannot be easily quantified. These factors include third 
party involvement, warnings of upcoming testing, role of money etc. It 
should also be pointed out that if athletes are able to manipulate tests 
then this would make it even harder to detect doping. This does not 
necessarily mean tampering with sample collection, or tampering with 
the samples after collection (which still may occur despite measures 
taken to prevent this), but rather for example athletes may take doping 
agents immediately after testing, knowing that it is unlikely they will 
be tested again soon. If athletes can partly predict when tests are going 
to occur and/or can manipulate testing then it will lower probability 
of detection in a single test and this strengthens this papers argument. 
There may also be specific effects of the method of doping or testing 
that would deviate somewhat from the simple calculations.
The cost of effective anti-doping
If one then focuses on the testing required per year, per athlete, 
for effective detection, the next step is to then extrapolate this into 
real world financial figures. Put simply, it is necessary to make a cost 
determination of such an increase in the testing regime and thus a 
determination of the cost of an effective and efficient means of doping 
detection.
Furthermore, reference again to Table 5, one can also see the total 
cost per athlete per year of doping tests needed to reliably detect doping 
, is on average €21,190.86 (USD 28,676.30). This is an average based 
upon the number of tests needed which ranges from 16 to 50 depending 
on the discipline. This uses approximate urine test cost figures as 
available through Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA) 
[63] of about €584 (AU$738, USD 692.59) per test (blood and EPO 
testing costs are higher). Urine tests were chosen as they are most 
commonly used test for doping detection and the least expensive. Other 
testing, such as blood testing, has higher costs associated with it and 
therefore any calculations would produce greater costs/numbers. There 
is some argument that blood testing required for the Athletes Biological 
Passport (ABP) is cheaper, but given the added difficulties in analysis 
and collecting blood samples, the trained staff needed etc. it seems that 
in the long run even ABP blood testing would cost more than urine. 
The lower figures were used in the calculations simply to demonstrate 
that even at the lowest level the costs associated with effective testing 
would amount to an astronomical figure. The approximate total cost 
per year for all athletes in a given nation to be subject to such tests, 
is subject to the nation in question. If one is to take as an example 
Germany, and one refers to their website for appropriate data relating 
to the testing pool, one begins to see the scale. Current data shows that 
Germany’s athletes number around the 4000 [42], this however, does 
not including the national testing pool of athletes). Given these figures 
the total funds would need to exceed 84 Million Euros (€84,763,428.57 
or about USD$114,715,721.16). The German National Anti-Doping 
Associations total annual revenue was €4,570,062 (USD 6,184,576.60) 
for the year ending 2010 [42], this would result in a €80,193,366.57 
(USD 108,514,946.82) shortfall.
What is more, this figure incorporates only the actual cost of tests, 
it does not take into account the additional costs associated with anti-
doping testing. These would include, but not be limited to, hiring sample 
collection staff, collection materials, Out of Competition travelling for 
collection, physical resources etc. Therefore, what this shows is that 
the level of testing needed to effectively detect doping is economically 
unfeasible. Whilst it is likely true that some of the cost of testing will be 
borne by the national federations themselves, it does, however, seems 
highly unlikely that all the levels of funding needed for complete testing 
will be available given economic realities. Sports may be a lucrative area 
but there are still realities about real world economics and financing 
that demonstrate that despite the figures involved, the level of funding 
needed to make an effective testing regime is infeasible.
Biological passport and forensic testing
One cannot assert to having fully addressed the ineffectiveness 
of the current anti-doping system without addressing the existence 
Sport Tests Needed Approximate Cost
Air Sports 43 € 25,112.00
Archery 22 € 12,848.00
Baseball 50 € 29,200.00
Bobsleigh 50 € 29,200.00
Cycling 16 € 9,344.00
Football 30 € 17,520.00
Rowing 43 € 25,112.00
Table 5: Doping testing needed (per year per athlete) to reliably detect doping. 
Based on current WADA figures and doping characteristics as outlined in table 4, 
and examples of costs per year (using urine tests) per athlete for reliable detection 
of doping.
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and usage of both the Athlete Biological Passport (ABP) [64] and an 
assortment of forensic methods such as hair testing. WADA outlines 
the ABP as,
The fundamental principle of the Athlete Biological Passport (ABP) 
is to monitor selected variables (`biomarkers of doping´) over time 
that indirectly reveal the effect of doping, as opposed to the traditional 
direct detection of doping by analytical doping controls.
In effect the ABP is a tool for keeping track of the changing 
variables in human physiology. Unlike conventional testing it does 
not directly determine the existence of doping substances in the body 
system but instead considers its indirect consequences. This method 
is often argued as being the next generation in anti-doping testing; a 
more effective test, one with greater potential than conventional testing 
[64-66]. Yet there is ample evidence that supports the notion that, like 
conventional testing, the ABP is far from perfect and as such supports 
the supposition that current anti-doping is ineffective. 
To begin with, there is the debate surrounding indirect testing. 
It is true that in some cases doping can be detected without directly 
discovering the substance in the blood. This is done through indirect 
blood or urine biomarkers [65-67]. However, these same markers can 
also be an indication of an assortment of other causes from illness, 
medical assistance, training techniques, physiological uniqueness of 
an individual etc [68,69]. It does not in every case indicate the use of 
banned substances. Despite this the athlete still needs to, in effect, prove 
their innocence. An additional issue with the ABP can be found in the 
research by Ashenden, Gough, Garnham, Gore & Sharpe [70]. Their 
research involved the intravenous injection of recombinant human 
erythropoietin (rhEPO) into 10 subjects for up to 12 weeks. Results of 
the study found that in microdose amounts EPO was undetectable in the 
ABP. If the ABP at present is not even detecting what it was introduced 
to detect then one can quite clearly conclude that it is ineffective. 
Further issues with the ABP have been reported in areas one 
may not normally expect to be such a major factor contributing to 
ineffectiveness. Banfi [71] has reported the ABP may be affected by an 
assortment of factors such as:
‘Quality control of the instruments is not completely assured. 
Analytical variability is not appropriately considered in the program. 
The seasonal changes of the hematological parameters, due to training 
and competitions, are not calculated. Statistical analysis, based on a 
Bayesian-like program, not available to the scientific community, does 
not follow the classical decision making approach of medicine and 
science.’
All of these factors indicate that at present the ABP has its shortfalls 
and may in fact currently not be an effective tool for anti-doping, or at 
least not to the level it should be. 
Furthermore, a number of key international experts in the area 
of cycling have criticised yet another issue with the ABP. As outlined 
previously, both Gerard Vroomen former head of Cervelo TestTeam 
and international anti-doping expert Michael Ashenden reported a lack 
of testing with regard to the ABP. This lack of testing demonstrates that 
the current system is ineffective; be that because testing is inaccurate, 
imprecise or simply not occurring (perhaps due to economic reasons). 
These could explain the drop in extreme blood values in cyclists since 
the introduction of the ABP. If there are long periods of no testing then 
of course the more extreme values are likely to be missed.
It has also been argued that there has been more Anti-Doping 
Rule Violations (ADRVs) in cycling since the introduction of the ABP. 
Even if there are more ADRVs in cycling, the actual number of athletes 
sanctioned because of the ABP remains extremely low. In this regards 
can it be said that the ABP is having the desired effect? If athletes who 
are under the ABP are being found to have questionable results, and as 
such brought up on charges for anti-doping violations, but still are not 
being sanctioned, then is the program really helping the state of affairs 
or simply making them worse ?.
In the case of modern forensic testing, there is still some debate 
as to tests’ effectiveness. WADA for example still has not certified the 
use of forensic testing methods, such as hair analysis, in their anti-
doping systems. There are some issues with hair testing. Unlike urine 
or blood, hair is not always present and available for testing. This can be 
because of baldness or shaving by the athlete. Similarly, it is simply not 
possible to detect all the same substances as urine or blood testing does. 
Or is the decision not to sanction hair testing due to the cost? Would 
it not cost significantly more (at present) to undertake such analyses? 
More research is required to ascertain the effectiveness and efficiency 
of various forms of forensic testing, but the reality is at present that 
these techniques are not used (for whatever reason) and as such 
cannot be said to be part of the current anti-doping system. There is 
one case worth mentioning, the case of Richard Gasquet. In order to 
clear his name, he ordered an independent hair analysis to determine 
the presence of cocaine in his system. This was accepted by the Court 
of Arbitration in Sport (CAS). The reality remains this acceptance was 
not issued by WADA nor the International Tennis Federation (ITF), 
and what is more, the test was negative. Gasquet later admitted use but 
argued it was inadvertent and no fault of his own, this was accepted by 
the CAS [72]. Overall this brings into question the effectiveness of the 
hair testing.
Limitation and Future Research
In November 2013 WADA’s Foundation Board meeting [73] 
decided on the introduction of a Steroidal Module into the ABP. This 
method of profiling may change the effectiveness of the current anti-
doping testing. At this point there is too little evidence to determine its 
current effectiveness and so more testing and time is needed. One can, 
however, say that if the same problems arise with the Steroidal Module 
as with haemoglobin; the same scientific issues and ethical issues 
are involved, then the findings of this research will be strengthened. 
Similarly if WADA decided to confirm the use of hair and/or similar 
forensic testing methods, further research will be needed to assess 
how this may change the effectiveness of anti-doping testing. One 
key limitation to this research is the difficulty finding specific figures 
relating the four variables for the formula. The clandestine nature of 
doping made obtaining exact figures impossible and as such estimates 
were used. Exact figures would ensure a more complete picture could 
be painted.
Conclusion
The primary conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that 
the current system of anti-doping is, given the realities of the sporting 
world, ineffective at reaching the desired goals. This is assuming 
the primary goal of the anti-doping system is to eliminate doping, 
irrespective of whether this is because of the athletes health, fairness 
and equality or natural ability arguments. Furthermore, it would seem 
that should the current system of anti-doping remain, significant 
increases would need to be made in the testing levels; this in turn would 
require a significant increase in revenue for anti-doping collection and 
testing. This may be economically impossible and thus other solutions 
to the ubiquitous problem of doping may need to be sought, outside of 
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individual scientific tests. The alternative is to invest additional funds 
into the development of more advanced, efficient and effective tests for 
the detection of doping. If it were possible to increase the test reliability, 
the window of detectability and the range of substances that could be 
detected, this would mean the increase of the number of tests could be 
more modest. Such an increase may well be affordable. On the other 
hand, this would still not eliminate the issues with test predictability 
or corruption and as such further demonstrates the current system 
needs work in order to become both efficient and effective in deterring 
and punishing doping. The ABP appears to be the solution to the 
problem but further analysis reveals that it has its shortcomings just 
like chemical testing. Overall it would seem that the current system, as 
it stands, needs to be reconsidered and reworked in order to be effective 
and efficient.
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